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GRASSROOTS ORIGINALISM: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
ARGUMENTS, THE ABORTION DEBATE, AND THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
Mary Ziegler*
I. INTRODUCTION
How has originalism become so politically successful?1 In answering
this question, leading scholarship has focused on the ways in which
political leaders, judges, and lawyers have cultivated popular support for
originalism. In one account, legal academics, politicians, and judges have
explained the legal merits of originalism as a method of interpretation: its
political neutrality and its democratic legitimacy.2 In a second version,
political leaders—in particular, the Reagan Administration and the judges it
nominated—made apparent that originalism would often produce outcomes
that social conservatives found satisfactory.3 With some exceptions, leading
studies primarily address the contributions made by elites to rhetoric about
and justifications for originalism, including those rationales based on
judicial activism and judicial legitimacy.4
∗
I would like to thank Joel Goldstein, Roger Goldman, Anders Walker, and Eric Miller for their
help with earlier drafts of this piece.
1
This Article focuses in particular on claims justifying originalism as democratically legitimate when
other interpretive approaches are “activist.” For discussion of claims of this kind, see, for example, ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40 (1997); Thomas Colby, The New
Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 777 (2011); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88
TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (citing Rush Limbaugh’s view that “[t]he only antidote . . . to judicial activism is the
conservative judicial philosophy known as Originalism”).
2
See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 137–38 (1996)
(summarizing the view that originalism’s appeal lies in the failure of liberals to introduce a “principled
alternative”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
2–8 (1971) (“Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no
principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other.”); Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of
Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 779–95 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic
Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (“The appeal of
originalism is that the moral principles so applied will be the foundational principles of the American
Republic—principles we can all perceive for ourselves and that have shaped our nation’s political
character—and not the political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.”).
3
See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 662 (2009); Stefanie A. Lindquist
et al., The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 103, 104–06 (2007)
(offering empirical evidence that “restraintist” judges are guided by ideological commitments to
federalism and to a strong Executive Branch); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545–46 (2006); Neil S. Siegel,
Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 558–62 (2010).
4
See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that the term “grassroots,” used here
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By focusing on arguments about the backlash against Roe v. Wade,5 this
Article shows that an important justification for originalism—one based on
the political consequences of “judicial activism”—emerged from
interactions between activists, judges, and political leaders. However, these
consequentialist contentions for originalism and against Roe emerged not in
the academy or in the courts, but through dialogue between the elites,
social-movement members, and the Grassroots Right.6 In 1980–1981,
antiabortion advocates began arguing that Roe should be overruled because
of the consequences of the Court’s activism: the creation of the antiabortion
movement, the polarization of debate, and the effective preclusion of any
meaningful legislative compromise.7
As we shall see, these were not justifications for originalism as such but
rather arguments against judicial activism and Roe. But as this Article will
show, by the mid-1980s, Reagan Administration officials had seized on
these consequence-based justifications and transformed them into
arguments for originalism. Later, these contentions featured in the work of
first-generation originalist scholars. As this Article shows, the politics of
originalism have been conducted from the bottom up as well as from the top
down.
There is a good deal at stake in understanding the role of socialmovement activists and the Grassroots Right in creating consequence-based
justifications for originalism. First, scholars sometimes adopt consequencebased attacks on Roe as accurate descriptions of movement responses to the
decision.8 As this Article shows, by contrast, claims about backlash to Roe
or in other scholarship, is inherently ambiguous: Are the leaders of major national movement organizations
members of the elite, the grassroots, or both? Do physicians or attorneys working in movement organizations
belong to the elite by virtue of their professional status? While acknowledging the complexity of these identity
issues, this Article focuses on the interactions between social-movement members, including leaders and rankand-file activists, and the elites.
5
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6
For examples of similar consequence-based claims made in the academy and the courts, see Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953–56 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 1000–01 (1992) (plurality decision) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Health,
497 U.S. 261, 300–01 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 159, 169, 193, 234 (1990); Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Review on the Basis of
“Regime Principles”: A Prescription for Government by Judges, 26 S. TEX. L. REV. 435, 439–40 (1985). The
term originalism first appeared in Paul Brest’s 1980 criticism of similar interpretive methods, making it unlikely
that scholars would have defined themselves as originalists before the 1980s. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for Original Understanding, 80 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). On Brest’s coining the term, see Reva B. Siegel,
Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1401 n.3 (2009).
Nonetheless, this Article follows Richard Fallon and Reva Siegel in describing these scholars as first-generation
originalists, distinguishable from a new generation of scholars discussed, among places, infra note 8 and
accompanying text. On Fallon and Siegel’s use of “first generation” originalism, see, for example, Richard
Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?,
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 13 (2011) and Siegel, supra at 1401.
7
See, e.g., BORK, supra note 6, at 159, 169, 193, 234; Graglia, supra note 6, at 439–40.
8
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn argue, for example, that, because of Roe, “Pro-life traditionalists
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emerged from dialogue between New Right and antiabortion movement
members and political leaders. We should be cautious about the historical
validity of claims that have served so political a purpose.
Second, by so often focusing on the academics, politicians, and judges
who have popularized consequence-based justifications for originalism, we
have not fully captured the distinctiveness or importance of popular,
judicial activism-based justifications for originalism. Some movement
claims may appear to echo first-generation originalist arguments that
activist decisions are undemocratic or even illegitimate. On closer
examination, as this Article contends, grassroots claims against judicial
activism have a distinctive language, and their purpose and rhetoric differ
considerably from the arguments articulated by politicians and professors.
As we shall see, these claims drew on the kind of natural law thinking
rejected by first-generation originalists, invoking religious and moral
concerns as much as democratic ones. Scholars should be more attentive to
the uses, meaning, and purpose of these grassroots and movement claims.
For this reason, the materials assembled here suggest that the battle for
the future of constitutional interpretation will not be won by whoever has
the best theory. The politics of judicial philosophy have involved an
unpredictable and highly contingent give-and-take between grassroots
activists and the political and judicial elites. This will likely continue to be
the case in the future.
My argument proceeds in three segments. Part II.A briefly sets out
leading scholarship on the politics of originalism. Part II.B challenges
current accounts by closely examining how a consequence-based
justification for overruling Roe evolved in the 1980s. Drawing on the
history, Part II.C examines the implications of this history for current
studies of originalism. Part III briefly concludes.

mobilized as a normative social movement seeking to preserve not only human life but also a traditionalist ethic
of family values and women’s domestic role. They criticized Roe v. Wade because it took the most moral of
issues away from family and state decision making, represented arrogant judicial legislation, and marginalized
the interests of the fetus . . . .” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 242 (2010). Cass Sunstein agrees that Roe “probably contributed to the creation
of the ‘moral majority’; helped defeat the Equal Rights Amendment; prevented the eventual achievement of
consensual solutions to the abortion problem; and severely undermined the women’s movement, by defining that
movement in terms of the single issue of abortion, by spurring and organizing opposition, and by demobilizing
potential adherents.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 147 (1993); see also Michael J. Klarman,
Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1739, 1751 (1997)
(describing the “conventional understanding of Roe v. Wade” as the notion that “far from reconciling abortion
opponents to a woman’s fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, the decision actually spawned a right-tolife opposition which did not previously exist”).
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II. ANALYSIS
A. From the Top to the Right: Conventional Accounts of Political
Originalism
The political appeal of originalism is at the center of at least three
important scholarly debates. Of course, as Reva Siegel has written, “There
is not one theory of originalism, but many.”9 My purpose here is not to
argue for or against any kind of originalism or for or against originalism
writ large. Instead, my focus is on why the public, and the Grassroots Right
in particular, has been so receptive to a stylized, oversimplified version of
originalism: Originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation that
emphasizes text, history, and authorial intent and rejects the idea of a
“living Constitution” that changes over time.
One body of scholarship on this question addresses the operation and
appeal of originalism. Antonin Scalia, Michael McConnell, and other
defenders of either first- or second-generation originalism assert that the
appeal of the philosophy is primarily legal, and legitimacy-based claims for
originalism are appealing in principle.10 For these scholars, ordinary citizens
are attracted to originalism and its anti-activism justifications because it is
the only democratically legitimate and politically neutral interpretive
method.11 McConnell explains that originalism, and legitimacy-based
arguments for it, are seductive, because originalism “supplies an objective
basis for judgment that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological
stance.”12 Scalia has described the attraction of originalism and the antijudicial activism arguments supporting it by drawing attention to the flaws
of its alternatives, which, in his words, focus on what the Constitution
“ought to mean.”13
The suggestion in this scholarship is that originalism and concerns
about judicial activism enjoy popular support because it is the most
principled alternative available. In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Scalia further suggested that, in the

9

Siegel, supra note 6, at 1403. For a recent account of the different brands of originalism, see
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
10
See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11
See, e.g., KALMAN, supra note 2, at 137–38.
12
See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY
(2005)).
13
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 3, 39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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abortion context, the public has expected and even demanded that the Court
adhere to originalism.14 By contrast, if the Court claimed that “the ‘liberties’
protected by the Constitution are . . . undefined and unbounded,” then the
people would and should rise up.15 As Scalia framed it, popular demand for
originalism and popular hostility toward judicial activism simply reflect an
interest in democracy and apolitical judging.
For some time, scholars have questioned the legal merits of
originalism.16 But as Jamal Greene has observed, the academic attacks on
originalism do not appear to have made a dent in its popularity in the courts
or with the general public.17 This phenomenon has led those skeptical of
originalism to seek alternative explanations of its appeal. In a 2006
Fordham Law Review article, Robert Post and Reva Siegel argued that
“[t]he current ascendancy of originalism does not reflect the analytic force
of its jurisprudence, but instead depends upon its capacity to fuse aroused
citizens, government officials, and judges into a dynamic and broad-based
political movement.”18 In the context of gun rights, for example, Siegel has
shown that justifications for originalism emerged from a give-and-take
between social-movement organizations, political leaders, and the courts.19
Following Post and Siegel, two bodies of scholarship have questioned
what it means to describe originalism as a political practice. One body of
work has presented and analyzed originalism and the judicial-activism
arguments for it as a form of popular constitutionalism.20 Much of this
scholarship identifies one of two sources of this popular engagement. One
body of work describes the role of the Reagan Administration in

14

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000–01 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in

part).
15

Id. at 1001.
See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 950–51 (1988) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987));
Berman, supra note 9, at 5–6 (distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” originalism); Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 216–18 (1980); Thomas B.
Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244–45 (2009) (arguing that originalists’
work consists of a “smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories” that are “rapidly evolving”).
17
See Greene, supra note 3, at 659–60; Ideological Chasm over Interpreting Constitution, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. PUBL’NS (June 20, 2011), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2029/poll-supreme-courtintrepret-constitution-originalism.
18
Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 549.
19
See generally Greene, supra note 1, at 6 (“American originalism is an instrument through which a
domestic, sociopolitical movement seeks to validate its political commitments and to influence our courts.”);
Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191,
215–16 (2008); Siegel, supra note 6, at 1401 n.3.
20
See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Judical Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
2047, 2047 (2010); Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 701, 703 (2007); Siegel, supra note 19, at 192.
16
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popularizing originalism.21 In particular, Post and Siegel have highlighted
the role of former Attorney General Edwin Meese in drawing citizen
attention to the issue of judicial philosophy.22
Reagan’s judicial nominees are also thought to have publicized
originalist claims and anti-judicial activism claims for it.23 For example, in
studying the conservative groundswell that greeted the Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas, Siegel claims that Scalia defended originalism and
warned grassroots conservatives “that if they did not mobilize to protest the
Court’s decision in Lawrence, then the Lawrence opinion would soon be
read to authorize gay marriage.”24 Other scholars have broadened this
contention, focusing on the role of Republican politicians or judicial
nominees in spreading popular arguments for originalism.25
Using originalism as an example, a related body of scholarship seeks to
identify what makes any judicial philosophy a political success.26 This work
has both descriptive and prescriptive dimensions: it helps to explain the
current prominence of originalism and judicial-activism talk and identifies
ways in which a truly competitive alternative might be developed.27
Threaded through each of these debates, as we have seen, are important
claims about the ways in which elites have popularized various arguments
for a jurisprudence of original intent. These leaders may be scholars and
judges highlighting the legal strengths of originalism, or they may be
political figures hinting at the outcomes that philosophy will produce.
Scholars like Greene and Siegel acknowledge that the political appeal
of originalism arises through interactions between the grassroots and the
elites.28 Nonetheless, current scholarship primarily analyzes the role played
by the elites in popularizing originalism.29 In the case of Roe, important
legitimacy-based arguments for originalism were not spread by experts to
lay audiences but rather were created in a discussion between activists,
professors, and politicians.30 The dialogue that helped to produce these
arguments was complicated and fluid. It is important to stress that
popularizing a particular theory of constitutional interpretation has not been

21

See, e.g., Greene, supra note 3, at 659–60; Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–61.
See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–51.
23
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1347 (2006).
24
Id. at 1346.
25
See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3, at 558–62.
26
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 3, at 660–61.
27
Id.
28
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
29
See, e.g., supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.
30
See infra Part II.B.
22
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and likely will not be a matter of simply persuading ordinary citizens. The
process will be dynamic, unpredictable, and interactive.
Second, the history considered here suggests that too little is known
about the vocabulary, aims, and strategies of grassroots opponents of
judicial activism. By focusing on elite efforts to cultivate support for
originalism, current studies have assumed that grassroots activists make the
same kinds of claims about originalism as do the political leaders or
academics who explain it to them. In truth, in the abortion debate, lay
advocates critical of progressive activist judging have contentions and aims
of their own.
How did the Grassroots Right participate in the creation of arguments
for originalism? Part II.B turns next to this question.
B. Why to Overrule Roe, 1981–1990
As we shall see, the popularization of originalism, or something like it,
began with politicians and academics.31 In the political context, during the
1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon promoted “strict
constructionism,” whereby courts apply only the meaning of a legal text as
it was written.32 During Nixon’s two terms in office, there was some public
interest in what “strict constructionism” meant.33 In announcing the January
1970 nomination of southern judge G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme
Court, Nixon promised to seek judges who would “interpret” but not
“make” law.34 He elaborated further on the meaning of strict
constructionism during the successful nomination of William Rehnquist.
Then, Nixon asserted that the alternative to a strict constructionist judge
was one who would “twist or bend the Constitution in order to perpetuate
his personal political and social views.”35 During his hearings, Rehnquist
echoed Nixon’s arguments and further explained that “constructionist”
judges would rely exclusively on the “language used by the framers [of the
31

See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 3.
For analysis of Nixon’s “strict constructionism,” see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 280–83 (2009); Keith E. Whittington, William H. Rehnquist: Nixon’s Strict
Constructionist, Reagan’s Chief Justice, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT
DYNAMIC 8, 9–27 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003); S. Sidney Ulmer, Supreme Court Justices as Strict and
Not-So-Strict Constructionists: Some Implications, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 13, 13 (1973).
33
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 282–83.
34
Carswell Seen as Perfect “Strict Constructionist,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1970, at 44, available at
1970 WLNR 54396.
35
Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H.
Rehnquist To Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 337 PUB. PAPERS 1054
(Oct. 21, 1971).
32
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Constitution], the historical materials available, and the precedents which
other Justices of the Supreme Court have decided in cases involving a
particular provision.”36
The failed Carswell nomination and the direction taken by the Burger
Court diminished interest in strict constructionism and in judicial
philosophy more generally.37 The month Nixon announced Carswell’s
nomination, leaders of the civil rights movement went on the attack. Former
NAACP legal advisor L. D. Clark informed the New York Times that “strict
constructionism” was “open[ly] [and] blatant[ly] segregationist.”38 During
Carswell’s hearings, NAACP advocates revealed that, in 1948, the judge
had made a speech extolling the virtues of white supremacy.39 Nixon’s
proposed philosophy had become inextricably linked with the politics of
race.
What was more, once on the Court, Nixon’s nominees appeared to be
more similar to the justices who had come before them than Nixon might
have wanted. A series of sweeping decisions penned or joined by Nixon
nominees, including Roe, appeared as far-reaching as anything issued by the
Warren Court.40 Whatever Nixon had been talking about, the Supreme
Court seemed to be doing something else entirely.
The most developed discussion of judicial activism had emerged
several decades earlier in the legal academy. Writing in 1959, in framing his
now-famous criticism of Brown v. Board of Education,41 Herbert Wechsler
presented an argument against judicial activism, contending that “[t]he man
who simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate result may not,
however, realize that his position implies that the courts are free to function
as a naked power organ, that it is an empty affirmation to regard them . . . as
courts of law.”42 After the early 1950s, members of the legal process
movement—a school of scholars who praised decisions based on the plain
meaning of a text, on constitutional design and institutional competence, or

36

Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 55 (1971) (statement of William H. Rehnquist).
37
See generally James B. O’Hara, Introduction to THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR
CONFIRMATION? 3, 4 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998); G. Harrold Carswell; Rejected for U.S. High Court, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1992, available at 1992 WLNR 4034548.
38
See Carswell Seen as Perfect “Strict Constructionist,” supra note 34.
39
Nixon Says He Did Not Know of Judge Carswell’s ’48 Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1970, at 15,
available at 1970 WLNR 56553.
40
For examples of the scholarship on the relationship between the Burger and Warren Courts, see
generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983)
and THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION?, supra note 37, at 3–8.
41
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12
(1959).
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on the presumed neutrality of procedural or process-based solutions—also
stressed claims against judicial activism.43
In the 1970s, first-generation originalist scholars took up similar
criticisms. In 1971, in setting out a jurisprudence of original intent, Yale
law professor Robert Bork revived attacks on judicial activism, focusing on
claims that judicial overreaching was unprincipled and illegitimate.44 As
Bork argued, the marital privacy right described in Griswold v. Connecticut,
the Court’s first substantive due process case in the modern era, was
unprincipled, since the judge in such a case would have “no basis other than
his own values upon which to set aside the community judgment embodied
in the statute.”45 The only way to avoid this kind of overreaching, Bork
went on, was to “stick close to the text and the history [of the
Constitution] . . . and not construct new rights.”46 Other originalist scholars
highlighted arguments against judicial activism. In several books attacking
the Supreme Court’s decisions on school integration, Lino Graglia
criticized “judicial policymaking.”47 In 1977, Raoul Berger published a
book-length defense of originalism, condemning as undemocratic the
activist decisions of the Warren Court.48 In 1976, then-Associate Justice
William Rehnquist offered similar arguments in favor of a “dead
Constitution.”49
During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan and the
members of his staff began to popularize arguments against judicial
activism.50 As we shall see, however, these claims were less forceful and
less developed than the ones that would appear in the decades to come. In
particular, in the early years, Reagan and his allies did not defend

43

See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
BAR OF POLITICS 51–59 (1962) (criticizing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), as
unprincipled); Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 162–67 (1964). On the legal process
school, see Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century’s
End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 25–31 (1999).
44
See Bork, supra note 2, at 4. For other examples of first-generation originalist criticism of
activist judging in the 1970s, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 693, 699 (1976) (arguing that any outcome advanced by a “freewheeling, non-elected judiciary is
quite unacceptable in a democratic society”) and RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 389–401 (2d ed. 1997).
45
See Bork, supra note 2, at 10. For the decision in Griswold, see 381 U.S. 479, 482–86 (1965).
46
See Bork, supra note 2, at 8.
47
See, e.g., LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE
AND THE SCHOOLS passim (1976).
48
See generally BERGER, supra note 44.
49
See Rehnquist, supra note 44, at 693, 699.
50
See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–61.
THE
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originalism as much as they attacked what they described as judicial
activism.51
Some of Reagan’s natural allies were avowed opponents of legal
abortion. Indeed, while he served as Governor of California and made an
unsuccessful 1976 presidential run, Reagan had made himself into the
favored candidate of the emerging New Right.52 “As they described it,
leaders of the New Right rose from the ashes of the Watergate scandal: the
result of ‘impatience with the shambles of the Nixon-Ford
Administration.’”53 One of the orchestrators of this movement was Paul
Weyrich, a co-founder of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative thinktank, and a co-founder of the Committee for the Survival of a Free
Congress (“CSFC”), a group dedicated to electing social conservatives to
Congress.54 Weyrich saw his mission as the creation of a grassroots,
politically pragmatic Right, a complement to the intellectuals who had
dominated conservatism.55 He explained to the press in November 1977:
“Conservatives have been led by an intellectual movement but not a
practical movement until now . . . . We [now] talk about issues people care
about, like gun control, abortion, taxes, and crime.”56 Weyrich’s
organizations provided valuable training and money to fledgling New Right
causes: by 1978, the CSFC and other conservative political action
committees, including the National Conservative Political Action
Committee (“NCPAC”), had raised more than $3 million for conservative
candidates.57
While Weyrich provided political strategy for these groups, Richard
Viguerie and his direct-mail organization offered lobbying and fundraising

51

See generally id. at 555–56.
See DAVID FARBER, THE RISE AND FALL OF MODERN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: A SHORT
HISTORY 165–75 (2010). For some of the more influential biographies of Reagan, see LOU CANNON,
PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME (1991) and JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, RONALD REAGAN:
FATE, FREEDOM, AND THE MAKING OF HISTORY (2007).
53
See Mary Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Antiabortion Moderates After Roe v. Wade,
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services.58 In 1980, Viguerie raised between $35 and $40 million for his
clients.59
Allied with Weyrich and Viguerie was the newly powerful Religious
Right.60 Although the Religious Right of the 1970s is primarily associated
with evangelical Protestantism, the movement attracted conservative
Catholics, Mormons, and Jews.61 The Religious Right also unified a variety
of Protestant groups that had previously disagreed on issues ranging from
abortion to the civil rights movement.62 New socially conservative
organizations included the fundamentalist Baptists like those to whom Jerry
Falwell preached, Pentecostals like those loyal to Pat Robertson, and both
northern and southern Baptists.63 Historians point to a number of long- and
short-term trends that contributed to the rise of this form of social
conservatism: for example, the fragmentation of the civil rights movement
of the 1950s and 1960s, the rapid demographic growth of populations
naturally attracted to evangelical Christianity, and the migration of a
significant number of Americans to states in the Sunbelt.64
Members of the Religious Right themselves claimed to have been
inspired by important cultural, social, and economic changes of the 1960s
and 1970s. A list offered in the promotional materials put out in 1980 by
one organization, the Moral Majority, may be representative: the Supreme
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Court had banned school prayer and had legalized abortion, the women’s
movement had won influential allies in criticizing some aspects of the
traditional family, and gays and lesbians had become more visible and more
vocal in demanding equal treatment.65 Between 1956 and 1977, the spread
of Christian television broadcasting reinforced concern about these social
changes: among others, Pat Robertson founded the Christian Broadcasting
Network (“CBN”) in 1970, and Jerry Falwell began broadcasting The Old
Time Gospel Hour in 1956.66
Falwell’s Moral Majority seemed be part of an important religious and
cultural shift. By 1976, both Time and Newsweek reported on polling data
from the American Institute of Public Opinion that led George Gallup Jr. to
proclaim 1976 as the “Year of the Evangelicals.”67 In a 1976 Gallup Poll,
34% of respondents claimed to have had a born-again religious experience,
and nearly half of all Protestants polled agreed that the Bible “is to be taken
literally.”68
By the mid- to late 1970s, as this Article will show, the Religious Right
had become a political force—a grassroots movement with a highly
structured and professional leadership. One influential group, Christian
Voice, was founded in 1978 as part of the Heritage Foundation.69 By 1979,
the organization had 100,000 members and a governing board that included
fourteen members of Congress.70 The Moral Majority, another Religious
Right organization, had a $3 million budget in its first year, one-third of
which was raised in one month alone.71 Described by Falwell as a “coalition
capable of steering America away from liberal, humanist and secular
tendencies,” the Moral Majority was also quickly establishing its political
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influence.72 By December 1979, Falwell was reaching an audience of 2.5
million and was raising $1 million a week in mail contributions.73
Founded in 1979 by former Colgate Palmolive salesman Ed McAteer, a
third organization, the Religious Roundtable, was focused on encouraging
conservative Christians to become politically involved.74 The group came to
include many of the best-known televangelists, including Falwell and
Robertson.75 During the Reagan Administration, when Christian
conservatives angrily protested the nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor to
the Court, Ronald Reagan’s White House was obliged to assuage the
concerns of Roundtable members, both in private sessions and in the
media.76
During Reagan’s presidential campaign, to an unprecedented extent, the
antiabortion movement allied itself with both the New Right and the
Religious Right. For example, having failed for several years to secure a
vote against the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”), in 1977, the National
Right to Life Committee (“NRLC”), the nation’s largest antiabortion group,
finally passed a resolution condemning the Amendment.77 The same year,
those at the helm of major antiabortion organizations like the NRLC and
March for Life appeared at a “pro-family” event led by Phyllis Schlafly,
and the leaders of these groups joined in condemning not only abortion but
also the ERA and publicly funded daycare.78
Between 1977 and 1980, a number of self-identified evangelical
Protestant antiabortion groups became prominent, including the influential
Christian Action Council (“CAC”).79 At the same time, mainstream groups
like the NRLC begin stressing openly religious arguments against
abortion.80 In the early 1970s, mainstream antiabortion leaders routinely
72
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insisted that their movement had nothing to do with religion. For example,
in 1974, the NRLC vigorously objected to claims that “the rationale for
abortion laws is related only to the religious convictions of individual
citizens, and to the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church in particular.”81
By contrast, by October 1977, the NRLC had passed a resolution describing
the organization as a religious (although not exclusively Catholic)
organization, asserting that the “Right to Life Movement is founded upon
the belief that God creates LIFE.”82 Other groups founded in the late 1970s,
like Judie Brown’s American Life League (“ALL”), openly proclaimed a
Catholic pro-life message.83
At the same time, however, the leaders of the mainstream movement
committed to a new pragmatism. As Keith Cassidy has documented, in the
immediate aftermath of Roe, the movement focused primarily on passing a
human life amendment that would have recognized rights to life from
conception to natural death.84 The appeal of an amendment was twofold.
First, such a measure would have banned many more abortions than even
the restrictions in place in many states before Roe.85 Almost as importantly,
as movement members saw it, an amendment would symbolize and
communicate the movement’s ideological commitments and refusal to
compromise. In 1973, for example, Joseph Witherspoon, an antiabortion
activist and professor at the University of Texas School of Law, argued that
an amendment was necessary not only to ban abortion but also to “assert[] a
great moral and legal truth.”86 Indeed, the movement almost uniformly
opposed amendments that would have overturned Roe and returned the
abortion issue to the states.87 Activists described these measures as
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compromises that would permit states like New York to legalize abortion.88
As Fordham law professor and antiabortion activist Robert Byrn explained
in 1973: “[W]e are a right to life movement. I rather doubt that our people
will come out in vast numbers to support an amendment which by inference
says that unborn children have no right to life.”89
By contrast, in the early 1980s, those who came to lead groups like the
NRLC were more willing to compromise, especially in the context of a
human life amendment to the Constitution. This became apparent after late
September 1981, when Utah Senator Orrin Hatch proposed a federalism
amendment that would return regulation of abortion to the states.90
Although the measure was proposed as a practical middle-ground solution,
mainstream antiabortion groups came out in favor of it. After a bitter
debate, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops endorsed the proposal
in November 1981.91 Archbishop John Roach of Minneapolis, the President
of the Conference, implied that the Bishops had endorsed a states’ rights
amendment primarily because it was seen to be more politically feasible.92
Similarly, in mid-December, a divided NRLC voted to endorse the
Hatch amendment.93 Indeed, Dr. John Willke, a leader of the organization,
described it as part of a long-term, incremental strategy to chip away at
Roe.94 For the Reagan campaign, the movement mainstream had become an
interesting and complicated potential partner. At the same time that the
movement had become more socially conservative and even religious in its
rhetoric, antiabortion leaders had made apparent a willingness to put
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political success and strategic savvy before the abstract principles the
movement espoused.
The summer 1980 platform announced at the Republican National
Convention was designed in part to attract these antiabortion leaders, as
well as their allies in the New Right.95 At first, the Reagan campaign
avoided the kinds of arguments made against judicial activism in the courts
or in the academy, instead stressing the kind of natural-law proposal many
first-generation originalists had found objectionable.96 In particular, the
platform proposed “the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary
who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human
life.”97 The judicial selection plank immediately won praise from social
conservatives. Jerry Falwell stated that the platform could hardly have been
better if leaders of the Religious Right had written it themselves.98
By October 1980, the judicial selection plank had drawn criticism from
lawyers in both political parties, as well as from the American Bar
Association House of Delegates, which had voted to oppose Reagan’s
proposal to select judges “on the basis of particular ideological or political
philosophies.”99 Initially, Reagan defended the platform, arguing: “We all
ought to have a compassion for innocent human life.”100 Over time,
however, the Reagan campaign revised its judicial selection proposal,
balancing the interests of social conservatives and antiabortion leaders on
the one hand and lawyers who advocated impartiality on the other.101
Leading this effort was Reagan advisor William French Smith.102 In
November 1980, he worked to characterize Reagan’s interest in antiabortion
judges as a desire to select only those judges who rejected what Smith saw
as the judicial activism of the Warren and Burger Courts.103 Smith did not
make clear how Reagan thought judges should interpret the Constitution,
but he drew on some of the attacks made on unprincipled judging by critics
like Rehnquist and Bork. He explained: “In a nutshell, [Reagan’s] political
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philosophy is the laws of the country should be made by the legislature and
construed by the judiciary, and, to the extent possible, not made by the
judiciary.”104
Given Reagan’s prior commitment to pro-life judges and his need to
address legal critics, abortion opponents could easily have understood
Smith’s statements as code for opposition to abortion. At the same time,
though, Smith’s language was vague enough to appease abortion rights
supporters, especially after October 1980, when Reagan responded to
feminist demands that a woman be nominated to the Supreme Court.105
In either case, with the support of grassroots conservatives, Reagan and
the Republican Party were spectacularly successful in 1980. Reagan handily
beat incumbent Jimmy Carter, carrying forty-four of fifty states.106 For the
first time in twenty-five years, Republicans retook the Senate.107 It seemed
likely that a Reagan nominee could successfully navigate the Senate on his
or her way to the Supreme Court. The remaining question was what kind of
judges Reagan would appoint.
1. The O’Connor Dispute, 1981
Antiabortion activists believed that they had the answer to this question
in early July 1981, when Reagan announced the nomination of Sandra Day
O’Connor to the Supreme Court.108 In her time as an Arizona legislator,
O’Connor had several opportunities to weigh in on policy questions
involving sex and reproduction. In the early 1970s, she had signed a
statement calling for population control in the United States that had been
drafted by Dick Lamm, the leader of an effort to reform Colorado’s
abortion ban.109 O’Connor had also been an acquaintance of Dr. Carolyn
Gerster, a recent president of the NRLC, the nation’s largest antiabortion
group.110 After the nomination was announced, Gerster immediately
informed the rest of the antiabortion community that, during her time in the
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Arizona State Legislature, O’Connor had supported the Equal Rights
Amendment and had voted in favor of an abortion liberalization bill.111
Members of the antiabortion movement were outraged by the
nomination. Representative Henry Hyde informed Edwin Meese III, a
longtime Reagan advisor and then-Counselor to the President, that he would
oppose the selection.112 Dr. John Willke, then-President of the NRLC,
threatened to attack O’Connor in the press if her nomination were not
withdrawn.113 Harold O. J. Brown, the head of the Christian Action
Council, an evangelical Protestant antiabortion group, wrote Meese that the
nomination would have a “disastrous effect . . . on the enthusiasm of the
evangelical community for President Reagan.”114
Publicly, before the confirmation hearings began, the Reagan
Administration paid little attention to the antiabortion attacks. In August
1981, Reagan himself described Carolyn Gerster as “vindictive.”115 An
anonymous aide told the New York Times: “[T]here’s going to be a lot of
sound and fury, but in the end, it’s going to end up signifying little or
nothing . . . .”116 Less publicly, however, as we shall see, Edwin Meese
argued to Reagan and the rest of the Administration that more had to be
done to convince both the movement and the general public of the problems
with judicial activism.
During Reagan’s first term, Meese had become an unofficial gobetween for social conservatives, and the O’Connor nomination proved to
be no exception. In a memorandum to Meese, one of his aides claimed that
antiabortion advocates believed that the courts had “been engaged in a
systematic effort to prevent the public from working its will on the subject
of abortion.”117 In fact, movement members had never emphasized such an
argument—the White House, not activists, had stressed the subject of
judicial overreaching.118
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The memorandum continued: “Whatever one may think of that
argument, or of the merits of abortion itself, the intensity of right-to-lifers
on the issue of judicial power should not be underestimated.”119 The
memorandum proposed a nomination strategy that would cater to
antiabortion advocates without appearing to be partisan: “It does not follow
that a pro-lifer must be nominated. It does follow, I think, that the
nominee’s record on the issue be examined with special scrutiny and that
the nominee regard Roe v. Wade and its progeny as most unwise assertions
of judicial power.”120 Although several years would pass before the Reagan
Administration would be in a position to implement the ideas set forth in
the memorandum, the basic outline of a strategy was in place. The
antiabortion movement could be won over not by criticizing legal abortion
but rather by condemning the Roe Court’s activism. Nonetheless, the
Grassroots Right would play a more complex role than might have been
predicted, creating as well as responding to claims about judicial activism.
2. Reworking the Argument
During the O’Connor confirmation hearings, leaders of the NRLC and
other antiabortion groups challenged the connection between rejecting
judicial activism and banning abortion. In congressional testimony, Father
Charles Fiore, a member of the National Pro-Life Action Committee, the
nation’s largest direct-action protest antiabortion organization, rejected the
idea of judicial restraint and demanded open hostility to Roe.121 As he
explained: “I find [O’Connor’s] philosophy as exemplified in her record as
a legislator and leader in the State Senate of Arizona [to be] clearly
proabortion, and so on the basis of criteria set forth by the platform of the
majority party in the Senate . . . she would appear to be unqualified.”122 A
beleaguered Carolyn Gerster also expressed doubt about Reagan’s promise
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to select “strict constructionists,” accusing the Administration of
“misrepresentation, evasion, and distortion of fact . . . .”123
Other advocates opposed to O’Connor, however, offered novel claims
about the justifications for rejecting judicial activism. For example, Gordon
Jones of United Families for America, a socially conservative grassroots
lobbying group, explained that O’Connor’s supposed approval of Roe
proved her judicial philosophy to be irrevocably flawed.124 As he asserted:
“[T]he issue is not abortion but judicial activism. Roe v. Wade happens to
be the worst example of judicial activism in this century . . . .”125 He even
addressed the Supreme Court, suggesting that the justices should be
concerned about the “seriousness of the loss of faith experienced by the
federal courts in recent years.”126
In his congressional testimony, Dr. John Willke elaborated further on
this argument. As Willke stated, “The Supreme Court’s 1973 abortion
decision had no authentic basis in the Constitution. Rather, they constituted
the most extreme examples of ‘judicial activism’ . . . in this century . . . .”127
He contended that O’Connor was, by definition, an activist if she regarded
“the 1973 abortion decisions as constitutional . . . .”128
Willke also developed a set of social and political justifications for
undoing Roe. He first argued: “We exist as a movement because of . . . Roe
. . . .”129 Although he himself had been involved in antiabortion activism
before Roe was decided,130 he asserted that Roe had created and sustained a
movement against abortion.131 Next, he claimed that Roe had destroyed any
possibility of political compromise: “[W]e live in a Nation that is totally
polarized on this issue. Unlike other issues in the body politic, there is no
midground, there is no compromise. A baby is either a baby or not . . . .” 132
Willke played on public anxiety about the emotion and intensity of the
abortion debate. As he framed it, the best way to produce a cooler, more
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rational debate was to overrule Roe. Willke was not yet making an
argument for originalism as such. Instead, his consequence-based claim was
made primarily against Roe and what he understood to be judicial activism.
Significantly, first-generation originalist scholars or other members of
the elite had not yet used such consequence-based arguments, either in
criticizing Roe or in defending originalism. The dominant defense instead
was a theoretical one: originalism was portrayed as the only principled,
law-like philosophy and the only one consistent with democratic principles.
Bork had suggested that judicial activism was illegitimate regardless of its
consequences, although admitting that the public might no longer support
judicial review if a judge made “explicit the imposition of his own
will . . . .”133
Raoul Berger and William Rehnquist specifically addressed the
consequences of judicial activism. Berger presented the Court’s usurpation
of self-government as the only relevant “consequence” of judicial
activism.134 No decision, even Brown v. Board of Education, was enough to
offset “countenancing undeniable judicial arrogations of power . . . .”135
Moreover, Berger did not offer the effects of judicial activism as a standalone argument for originalism. Instead, he brought up the issue only in
response to those who had argued for living constitutionalism by pointing to
its beneficial results (and in particular to the decision in Brown).136
Rehnquist went one step further, looking at historical examples of
activist decision-making.137 If living constitutionalism had given the public
Brown, as Rehnquist reasoned, it had also led to the Court’s decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, a notoriously racist decision striking down the
Missouri Compromise on slavery.138 Rehnquist did offer some explanation
as to why the Dred Scott Court’s activism was so disastrous, highlighting
the “injury [it caused] to the reputation of the Supreme Court . . . .”139 Just
the same, Rehnquist did not yet offer the negative consequences of activist
decision-making as an affirmative justification for his own philosophy.140
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Of course, Willke was offering only arguments against judicial
activism, not justifications for originalism as such. Just the same, his
arguments made an important contribution to conversation about judicial
legitimacy and judicial activism. He pointed to social and political
consequences that followed from activism instead of merely asserting that it
was undemocratic. He also suggested that the consequences of activism
were one of the main reasons for forswearing it. Why avoid judicial
overreaching? As Willke framed it, to answer this question, one needed
only look at the aftermath of Roe v. Wade.
3. At Odds, 1981–1984
In the early 1980s, as we shall see, not all grassroots activists were
convinced of the utility of Willke’s claims about judicial activism. In the
fall of 1981, in the aftermath of the confirmation, antiabortion leaders
believed that it would be more effective to restructure the courts than it
would be to try to change the interpretive method most judges employed or
to focus on the issue of judicial nominations. In September 1981, at a
Religious Right convention, Phyllis Schlafly instead argued for the
abolition of lifetime tenure for federal judges.141 In November, Weyrich’s
Free Congress Foundation put out a book entitled A Blueprint for Judicial
Reform, a volume partly focused on proposals to strip the federal courts of
jurisdiction.142 That fall, as many as thirty jurisdiction-stripping bills were
circulating in Congress.143
mother, on the other hand.” Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). However,
White was primarily establishing why Roe was undemocratic. See id. at 221–23. He was not predicting
or describing the consequences of the opinion. See id. Nor was he using those consequences as a
justification for a different method of constitutional interpretation. See id. Similarly, in 1975, Professor
Joseph Witherspoon of the University of Texas Law School, a leading member of the antiabortion
movement and the National Right to Life Committee, did formulate some kind of consequence-based
criticism of Roe. See S.J. Res. 6, Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States for
Guaranteeing the Right of Life to the Unborn; S.J. Res. 10 and S.J. 11, Proposing an Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States for the Protection of Unborn Children and Other Persons: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 523–
37 (1975) (statement of Joseph P. Witherspoon, Professor of Law, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law).
Witherspoon contended that Roe “stirred the American populace as have few decisions of the Supreme
Court since that institution came into being.” Id. at 549. However, Witherspoon invoked these
consequences only as evidence that the American people shared a commonsense judgment “that the
unborn human child is a human being who from conception to birth is indistinguishable in any essential
way from any other human being after birth . . . .” Id. at 540.
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REFORM 29, 35 (Patrick B. McGuigan & Randall R. Rader eds., 1981).
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Another option was the ratification of a human life amendment. Indeed,
Orrin Hatch presented his proposed amendment as a solution to the kind of
judicial activism highlighted by the White House.144 In campaigning for the
proposal, he stressed that the Supreme Court justices had, in Roe,
“impose[d] their personal standards on 230 million Americans,” mistakenly
intervening in “moral and social issues.”145
In spite of a somewhat belated campaign by President Reagan in
support of the amendment, antiabortion members of Congress could not
muster the votes to end a filibuster on the proposal that began in September
1982.146 Some in the movement despised the amendment, since it did not
announce the personhood of the fetus and made it possible to force
individual states to deny the humanity of the unborn child.147 Because some
advocates viewed it as a betrayal of the movement’s guiding philosophy, it
seemed that the Hatch proposal had cast serious doubt on the connection
between discouraging judicial activism and banning abortion.
In the fall of 1981, when the Reagan Justice Department again stressed
arguments about judicial activism, Administration officials borrowed from
and modified the antiabortion movement’s political justifications for
avoiding activist decision-making and overruling Roe. For example,
beginning in October 1981, Attorney General French Smith gave a series of
speeches outlining the priorities of the Justice Department.148 Without
mentioning or defining a jurisprudence of original intent, he explained that
the Justice Department would “focus upon the doctrines that have led to the
courts’ activism.”149 He singled out “the right to marry, the right to
procreate, the right of interstate travel, and the right of sexual privacy that,
among other things, may have spawned a right, with certain limitations, to
144
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have an abortion.”150 While not explicitly condemning any of the Court’s
decisions on these subjects, he labeled them arbitrary and “constitutionally
dubious and unwise intrusions upon the legislative domain.”151
Nevertheless, he put as much emphasis on political reasons for rejecting
judicial activism. In issuing decisions like Roe, as he explained, the Court
risked losing its own independence and prestige because of “subjective
judicial policy-making as opposed to reasoned legal interpretation.”152 Like
Dr. John Willke, he attributed both antiabortion outrage and the 1980
election to dismay with decisions like Roe. As he put it: “We believe that
the groundswell of conservatism evidenced by the 1980 election makes this
an especially appropriate time to urge upon the courts more principled bases
[of decision-making] that would diminish judicial activism.”153
Together, Smith’s speeches and the O’Connor confirmation hearings
also helped to increase the prominence of judicial activism arguments in
mainstream antiabortion advocacy. In 1982, Reverend Jerry Falwell of the
Moral Majority and Richard Viguerie put out books on Roe v. Wade and
judicial activism, stressing that Roe was “made against the tide of public
opinion” and had earned “condemnation by large segments of the public as
well as legal scholars . . . .”154
The new prominence of activism arguments was even more apparent in
June 1983, after the Supreme Court decided City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health.155 The Court invalidated several abortion
restrictions introduced by the city of Akron, including a twenty-four hour
waiting period and an informed consent provision.156
Instead of simply condemning the morality of the decision or speaking
out in favor of the personhood of fetuses, antiabortion leaders also
emphasized the issue of judicial activism. Senator Roger Jepsen, an avowed
opponent of legal abortion, contended that, in Akron, “the Supreme Court
[was] completely out of their jurisdiction.”157 Gary Curran, a leading
member of the American Life Lobby, added: “The Supreme Court thinks
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they are a super legislature for every city, town, county and state in
America.”158
4. Connection Undone? 1984–1985
In 1984, several political events again made antiabortion activists
downplay claims about judicial activism, including the consequentialist
claims created at the grassroots level. As historian Daniel K. Williams has
shown, in 1984 social conservatives made apparent that abortion was their
leading issue, not simply one among many.159 In trying to win back the
disillusioned Religious Right, Reagan adopted the more overtly moral
arguments that the movement had publicized in the 1970s. As part of his
effort to solidify support among social conservatives, Reagan even
published a book in 1984, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation.160
The book did restate judicial activism arguments against Roe, contending
“abortion-on-demand is not a right granted by the Constitution” and calling
Roe an act of “raw judicial power.”161 Much of the book focused, however,
on moral and medical claims: arguments that “[m]odern medicine treats the
unborn child as a patient” or that “[w]e cannot diminish the value of one
category of human life—the unborn—without diminishing the value of all
human life.”162
For their part, advocates on both sides of the debate primarily addressed
a prominent film, Silent Scream.163 The film was narrated by one of the
most controversial antiabortion activists, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a man
who had once been a leading member of the abortion rights movement and
a founding member of NARAL (originally the National Association for the
Repeal of Abortion Laws and, later, the National Abortion Rights Action
League).164 Narrated by Nathanson, the film depicted the abortion of a
twelve-week-old fetus.165 The film energized the movement, which spent
millions of dollars to screen the film on television news programs and in
schools.166 In a January 1985 conversation with Nellie Gray of March for
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Life, Reagan expressed hope that that the film would sway Congress to pass
legislation limiting abortion.167
The film prompted a strong response from the abortion rights
movement, one framed in the same moral terms used by the opposition. In
1985, NARAL began a campaign entitled “Abortion Rights: Silent No
More,” in which the group rounded up 40,000 letters from Americans who
had benefited from the availability of legal abortion.168 In August 1985,
Planned Parenthood planned to spend approximately $900,000 on
newspaper and magazine ads in support of the campaign, showing the faces
and names of women who had had abortions.169
By the summer of 1985, the abortion debate had shifted again, raising
interest in the issue of judicial activism. By June 1985, Douglas Johnson of
the NRLC concluded that there would not likely be a dramatic change in
Congress leading to passage of legislation that would overrule Roe.170 The
best strategy for the antiabortion movement was to abandon the doomed
human life amendment and take up a more productive project. Johnson
predicted a new focal point for debate: “The president has said he believes
[Roe v. Wade was] unconstitutional and we expect his nominees to reflect
that.”171
As leading studies suggest, Edwin Meese, Reagan’s second Attorney
General, also brought new attention to the issues of judicial activism and
originalism.172 By the summer of 1985, Meese began a campaign to reach
the broader legal community, an effort he launched with a July speech
before the American Bar Association.173 The July speech was considerably
more detailed than the Administration’s previous analyses of judicial
philosophy. Under French Smith, the Justice Department had primarily
condemned “legislating from the bench” without fully explaining what
restrained judges would do.174 By contrast, in the July speech, Meese
endorsed an “endeavor to resurrect the original meaning of [the
Constitution] . . . .”175 He urged courts to focus on discerning the motives of
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167
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the Constitution’s framers and, if necessary, looking to the history and
context of particular constitutional provisions.176
He also borrowed heavily from the political justifications for overruling
Roe that the antiabortion movement had created in the early 1980s.177 As
Meese presented them, however, these were arguments not just for undoing
Roe but also for adopting originalist interpretive methods.178 The Court’s
decisions, like Roe, had generated controversy and popular anger,
producing “intense feelings” on subjects about which “the public [was]
widely divided.”179 As he argued, originalism would allow the Court to
avoid “the charge of being either too conservative or too liberal.”180
At the same time, in the mid-1980s, consequence-based claims slowly
began to feature in the work of originalist scholars. For example, in 1985, in
discussing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dred Scott, Graglia mentioned
the social and political impact of this decision: “Preventing political
settlement . . . and apparently making the Civil War inevitable. . . .”181 He
also made clear that “[t]he consequences of that decision . . . must weigh
heavily in any overall assessment [of it].”182 For the most part, however, in
1987, when Robert Bork was nominated to the Supreme Court,
consequentialist arguments against Roe or for originalism had not become
prominent in the academy or in the courts.183 As we have seen, many
antiabortion activists were not yet convinced of the relevance of the issue of
judicial activism to their cause.
By the end of Bork’s confirmation hearings, as we shall see, members
of the Grassroots Right had begun to emphasize the issue of judicial
activism to a much greater extent, convinced as they were that originalism
would lead to the undoing of Roe. In turn, by the early 1990s, to a greater
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extent, scholars and jurists had begun to stress the consequence-based
claims developed at the grassroots level.
5. The Meaning of Robert Bork
By 1987, Robert Bork had become the best known judicial and
academic defender of originalism, as well as an outspoken critic of Roe v.
Wade, primarily citing his opposition to substantive due process.184 In
introducing Bork to the American public in July 1987, the Reagan
Administration—led by Chief of Staff Jim Baker—wanted to downplay
Bork’s views on Roe and present him as an apolitical figure. For example, a
talking points memorandum issued by the White House framed the issue as
“whether the judges and the courts are called upon . . . to interpret the
laws . . . . or whether judges and the courts should write orders and opinions
which are, in effect, new laws—the ‘activist’ view.”185 Since 1986, the
Administration had been concerned about what one Reagan aide described
as “opposition efforts to position the federal courts as ‘the tool of the far
right’ under Reagan.”186 In September 1987, the Administration responded
that “[i]deology should have no role” in Bork’s hearings.187 The only
interest groups shaping the process, the Administration suggested, were
those opposed to Bork—what the Administration called “individuals and
groups who have long demonstrated [that] they are outside the American
political mainstream.”188
It was abortion rights groups that fought back most effectively against
this portrayal of Bork. At the head of these efforts was an alliance of leftwing advocacy groups known as the Block Bork Coalition.189 The
organization was formed by the groups that had previously comprised
Ralph Neas’s Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a union of labor,
civil-rights, women’s-rights, disability-rights, and elderly-rights groups, and
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Nan Aron’s Alliance for Justice, a smaller collection of groups that
specialized in judicial nominations and in litigation.190
After conducting extensive focus group research, in August 1987 the
Coalition developed “themes” and “talking points” memos that offered the
broad outlines of a strategy to defeat Bork. The August “Themes Memo”
contended that, if Bork succeeded, particular political results would be
guaranteed.191 He would “provide the decisive vote to turn back the clock
for a number of decisions,” including those on abortion.192 As the Coalition
described it, the current Supreme Court was relatively apolitical, and most
citizens “accept[ed] and want[ed] to put behind them rulings on issues like
abortion.”193 A political crusader, Bork would introduce change and
instability into the law.
As we shall see, Bork helped to confirm the view of him presented by
both the antiabortion and abortion rights movements. In his opening
statements before Congress, Bork insisted that he had a healthy respect for
precedent, especially because judging required more circumspection than
did life in the legal academy.194 When pressed on his views about Roe,
however, Bork described the privacy decisions leading to it as “utterly
inadequate.”195 He deemed Roe itself to be a decision “contain[ing] almost
no legal reasoning.”196 Under questioning, he admitted to thinking that Roe
had been wrongly decided but proposed that the opinion might be “so
deeply embedded” in the precedent and practice of the country that it could
not be overturned.197
To many antiabortion activists, the Bork confirmation hearings made
clear that originalism did produce desirable results: Bork himself had
suggested that an originalist Court would not have created Roe v. Wade.198
190
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In time, as will become clear, these activists argued not only against Roe
but also for originalism. In turn, consequence-based arguments against Roe
seemed more salient to the originalist scholars, jurists, and sympathizers
dismayed by the tenor and outcome of Bork’s nomination hearings.
Consequence-based arguments figured centrally in originalist
scholarship and jurisprudence in the aftermath of the Bork hearings. In
1990, Bork himself took up these claims. He attributed antiabortion
“demonstrations, marches, television advertisements, and mass mailings” to
the Roe Court’s activism.199 Because the Court had not relied on
constitutional text or history, as Bork portrayed it, the Roe Court was
“perceived, correctly, as political.”200 He described a threat to the Supreme
Court’s legitimacy and “integrity” that was no longer abstract but evident in
social and political changes.201
A similar argument featured in Justice Scalia’s 1992 dissent in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,202 the opinion in which
a divided Supreme Court preserved but narrowed Roe.203 Like the Casey
majority, Scalia focused on the “political pressure” that Roe had
produced.204 However, Scalia urged the Court to pay “more attention to the
cause” of the unrest.205 In Scalia’s view, that cause was a “mode of
constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text and traditional practice
to determine the law, but upon what the Court calls ‘reasoned judgment,’
which turns out to be nothing but philosophical predilection . . . .”206
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What were the consequences of the Roe Court’s activism? Here again,
Scalia echoed the arguments honed by activists like Willke: “[B]y
foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by
banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even
the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, . . . the
Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.”207 Like Willke, Scalia
offered an account of the social and political consequences of Roe.208
Moreover, like Willke, he presented the impact of the decision as a reason
to undo it.209
Following the decision of Casey, scholars adopted arguments similar to
Scalia’s.210 Scalia himself made such arguments a centerpiece of his dissent
in Stenberg v. Carhart, a decision striking down federal bans on partialbirth abortion.211 Scalia invoked the political and social consequences of
both Roe and Casey. In his view, Roe “fanned into life an issue that has
inflamed our national politics in general, and has obscured with its smoke
the selection of Justices to this Court in particular . . . .”212 Casey, too, in
Scalia’s words would lead to “the perpetuation of that disruption . . . .”213 In
the end, as Scalia presented it, this political turmoil was an argument for
decision-making based on “constitutional text [or] accepted
tradition . . . .”214 The consequences of activism were a powerful argument
for originalism, at least if the Court was interested in “its own
preservation . . . .”215
Consequence-based arguments against Roe and for originalism have
become so prominent that many defending non-originalist interpretive
methods have had to explain the impact of their own approaches.216 For
example, in setting out a minimalist approach to constitutional
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interpretation, Cass Sunstein argues that the consequences highlighted by
Bork and Scalia emerged not because of a failure to adopt originalist
methods but because the Court decided too much too soon.217 Ruth Bader
Ginsburg has argued that the consequences Scalia describes occurred
because the Court did not offer an adequately convincing constitutional
rationale for abortion rights, especially one based on sex equality.218
Consequence-based arguments against Roe have become a central part
of debate about the decision and about the best methods of constitutional
interpretation. To a greater extent than is acknowledged in prior studies,
many grassroots activists and social-movement members created important
popular claims about judicial activism, claims that have become a
meaningful part of first-generation originalist scholarship and
jurisprudence.
C. Rethinking the Politics of Originalism
What more can the history considered here tell us about the politics of
originalism? As we have seen, the appeal of originalism figures in studies
on popular constitutionalism.219 It is at the center of discussion about the
jurisprudential merits of originalism.220 Other studies look at the attraction
of originalism in assessing why and how an interpretive method sustains
public interest.221 A common question runs through these debates: How do
judges, professors, and politicians successfully popularize a judicial
philosophy?
Scholars like Siegel and Greene envision the popularization of
originalism as a dialogic process, in which elites and grassroots both
participate.222 Nevertheless, scholars analyzing the attraction of originalism
often focus on the elites’ role in creating or explaining originalism and its
justifications.223 If we change the focal point of our analysis, we can better
appreciate the importance of studying what kinds of exchanges have
produced a politically successful judicial philosophy. As was the case with
crucial arguments for overruling Roe, grassroots activists and socialmovement members may well have played a central role in reshaping,
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creating, or reinterpreting judicial activism claims that play an important
part in justifying originalism.
As importantly, by stressing the role of elite actors, current scholarship
has often assumed that the justifications for originalism offered by lay
activists and government officials are one and the same. Indeed, grassroots
advocates formulated and popularized their own definitions of judicial
activism and judicial restraint.
1. Judicial Activism and the Radicals
One powerful example of this mode of reinterpretation can be seen in
the claims made by the direct-action branch of the antiabortion movement
in the 1980s. The radical wing of the movement was diverse and complex,
especially by the late 1980s. For example, in 1981, Father Paul Marx
founded one direct-action protest organization, Human Life International, in
Gaithersburg, Maryland, focusing on clinic protests, while Mark Crutcher’s
Life Dynamics sought to harass abortion providers by tying up their phone
lines and suing for malpractice.224 Moreover, the line between the directaction organizations and the older, generally more moderate groups was
fluid. The American Life League, a mainstream conservative Catholic
group, supported Operation Rescue, a direct-action protest unit, and
adopted tactics similar to those of the Pro-Life Action League, another
similar group.225
Operation Rescue and the Pro-Life Action League were the largest and
most influential direct-action protest groups.226 Although these
organizations did not explicitly mention originalism or define restrained
judging, they heavily emphasized the issue of judicial activism.227
Moreover, as this Article contends, these organizations also pioneered
important claims on the subject.
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The most influential such group early in the 1980s, the Pro-Life Action
League, was sustained largely because of the efforts of Joseph Scheidler.228
Born in Indiana to a prominent Roman Catholic family, Scheidler attended
the University of Notre Dame, became a journalist, considered but
ultimately decided not to join a Catholic religious order, and began teaching
at journalism school.229 In 1974, he convinced the Illinois branch of the
NRLC to hire him as director.230 In 1978, after he publicized a protest at the
Concord Clinic in Chicago, he lost his job at Illinois Right to Life, but he
and his remaining supporters within the group, including former Quaker
Oats Vice President Tom Roeser, formed a new organization, Friends for
Life (“FFL”).231 FFL established its reputation as the most radical
organization of its kind—the “Green Berets of the right-to-life movement,”
in the words of columnist Patrick Buchanan.232 In 1980, after a bitter
internal battle, Scheidler left FFL, founding the Pro-Life Action League
(“PLAL”) with his wife and one close ally.233
Scheidler began publicizing claims about judicial activism in 1984,
when he was building Pro-Life Action Network (“PLAN”), a network of
direct-action protestors.234 At a Fort Lauderdale, Florida, meeting that
attracted 600 activists, Scheidler relied on the illegality of Roe and on the
existence of a more important moral law in justifying his own tactics and
those of his supporters.235 However, Scheidler used his arguments against
judicial activism in favor of the kind of natural law reasoning rejected by
many first-generation originalists.236 As he explained in the New York Times
in December 1984: “I consider sit-ins obedience to a higher law. I’ll stay
after I’m told to leave as an act of desperation because I’m trying to save a
life.”237
Scheidler’s fame grew in 1985 when he published Closed: 99 Ways to
Stop Abortion, a strategy manual for clinic protestors.238 That year, in
responding to an increase in clinic bombings and other abortion-related
228
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violence, Scheidler reiterated his claims about judicial activism and said he
“neither condone[d] nor encourage[d] violence . . . . While perpetrators of
vandalism must be willing to accept the consequences of their act, in a real
sense their actions may be more than an option. For many, these actions
constitute a moral obligation.”239
As Scheidler became more prominent, he brought more attention to his
claims about judicial tyranny in Roe. Moreover, as he explained to the
Chicago Tribune in 1985, the Supreme Court had no authority “to force a
[moral] view” on the public.240 The only consequence of this raw judicial
power was obvious: the Court had “engender[ed] disrespect for the
law . . . .”241
Scheidler did echo some of the conventional claims made by firstgeneration originalists. But as we have seen, he also infused conventional
judicial activism arguments with religious and natural law principles. These
claims reworked and refracted conventional arguments against judicial
activism.
An organization similar to Scheidler’s, Operation Rescue, became the
most prominent such group in the late 1980s.242 At the beginning, Operation
Rescue was the brainchild of Randall Terry.243 Like many evangelical
Protestants of his generation, Terry was first exposed to arguments
condemning abortion and judicial activism when reading the works of
Francis Schaeffer.244 A pastor in the Reformed Presbyterian Church, a
fundamentalist sect, Schaeffer had moved with his family in 1948 to
L’Abri, Switzerland.245 He began his career in religious publishing in 1976
with How Shall We Then Live?: The Rise and Decline of Western Thought
and Culture.246 In 1979, Schaeffer’s son, Frank, made the book into a film
series.247 Appearing as the narrator of the film, Schaeffer described the
erosion of American culture that had resulted from the abandonment of
Biblical principles and the rule of God.248
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Judicial activism was both a cause and a symptom of secular
humanism.249 Schaeffer argued that, in decisions like Roe v. Wade, “the
Constitution of the United States can be made to say what the courts of the
present want it to say—based a court’s decision as to what the court feels is
sociologically helpful at the moment.”250 The justification for judicial
activism—in Schaeffer’s words, the belief that “[l]aw has only a variable
content”—came directly from man’s disastrous desire to be autonomous
from God’s revelation.251
In 1981, in A Christian Manifesto, Schaeffer elaborated on this
theory.252 There, he identified Roe as a key example of judicial activism.253
He echoed academic arguments that Roe had no constitutional foundation
and that the Court had made an essentially political decision that should
have been left to the elected representatives of the people.254 He also
asserted that the Roe Court’s activism was ungodly. Roe had made secular
humanism into a constitutional principle, holding that “[o]ne choice is as
valid as another.”255
Influenced by Schaeffer, in 1984 Terry and his wife began protesting
outside a local provider in Binghamton, New York, eventually leading
boycotts.256 By 1986, he had made contact with Joseph Scheidler and the
network of radical organizations he was in the process of building.257 A year
later, Terry was well on his way to forming Operation Rescue.258
Operation Rescue specialized in large protests and attracted substantial
media attention: for example, between 1987 and 1988, 211 protestors were
arrested in front of a Cherry Hill, New Jersey, clinic, 503 in New York, and
753 in Atlanta.259 The controversy made Terry himself something of a
celebrity and brought attention to Terry’s arguments about judicial tyranny.
In February 1989, for example, when Operation Rescue was sponsoring
a four-day protest predicted to draw several thousand participants, Reverend
Randy Aller, an ally of Terry’s, explained: “Abortion is legal, but it’s not
249
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lawful—there’s a higher law.”260 In March, while fighting an injunction
designed to block another protest, another ally echoed Terry’s claims that
“[n]o judge . . . has the right to make it legal to kill children.”261 Later in
1989, when Operation Rescue had scheduled ninety protests, Terry and
several colleagues were arrested for violating state trespass laws.262 Terry
used the trial as a platform for his arguments about judicial overreaching.263
In September 1989, when facing a California jury, Terry defended
himself by condemning Roe.264 In rejecting the Court’s illegitimate
decision, he had been “[standing] up to . . . tyranny.”265 Condemning Roe
was compatible with both the Constitution and with biblical principles. As
he explained to the jury, voting against Roe was not voting for anarchy. It
was “calling for . . . justice.”266 Like Scheidler, Terry combined
conventional arguments against judicial activism with natural law claims
about the natural or divine law.
Terry, Scheidler, and their organizations meant something very
different by judicial activism or judicial restraint than did Edwin Meese or
Robert Bork. In criticizing the sweeping decision of the Roe Court, Terry
and Scheidler marshaled not only constitutional but also explicitly religious
and moral arguments. They saw no tension between the two and even
argued that judges and juries should respect the “higher law.”
Moreover, concern about the democratic legitimacy of Roe or decisions
like it was, for Terry and Scheidler, only one issue among many. Each
activist assumed that the “higher law” always dictated the right answer.267
In decisions like Roe, the Court could be faulted for ignoring the will of the
people. However, if “the people” had themselves come up with the wrong
answer on abortion, Terry and Scheidler would have been no less likely to
protest.
These activists make clear that judicial activism arguments used by
grassroots activists can mean something quite different than the contentions
that are prominent in the academy. We have mostly missed these rich,
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alternative understandings because we have assumed that grassroots actors
simply adopted the claims pioneered by academics and judges. The truth is
much more complex.
III. CONCLUSION
Why has originalism acquired so much popular momentum? In the
academy, studies have focused on the role of law professors, judges, and
members of recent Republican presidential administrations.
The history of consequence-based justifications for overruling Roe
offers a different perspective on important, legitimacy-based arguments for
originalism. This history has several important implications. First, this
Article raises questions about scholarship suggesting that Roe created the
kind of crisis of legitimacy described by abortion opponents. Socialmovement members, many of whom were active before Roe, popularized
claims that the decision created the antiabortion movement and precipitated
a crisis of judicial legitimacy. We should be careful about assuming the
historical truth of claims that have so obvious a political and instrumental
purpose.
Second, this Article highlights the extent to which important
justifications for originalism were forged in a dialogue between socialmovement members, elite and grassroots actors. Significantly, lay activists
added arguments of their own to the discussion. This suggests that ordinary
citizens are not simply consumers, students, or members of an audience. At
least in the abortion context, they are also contributors and creators. This
Article shows that too little is known about how grassroots actors
understand and deploy the rhetoric of judicial restraint. To the extent that
the history considered here is an example, lay advocates have been more
influential, active, and inventive in this process than is currently thought.
Finally, studies asking how any judicial philosophy gains political
currency may have obscured the history of important justifications for
originalism and important arguments about judicial legitimacy. If we focus
primarily on the ways that the elites inspire, educate, and mobilize citizens
behind any interpretive method, we might miss important contributions
made by grassroots actors. How will the politics of originalism evolve? In
answering these questions, we would be wrong to deemphasize the role
played by grassroots activists. As in the past, their influence may be hard to
ignore.

